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Abstract
Total employment in Germany is supposed to increase if people could
realize their desired working hours. However, this back-of-the-envelope
calculation overestimates the eect of loosening hours constraints, because
even in a very exible labor market there will exist hours restrictions for
certain jobs and occupations. Therefore, I simulate Germans' working
hours in a more exible but real world, namely the Dutch labor market.
The results indicate that the average weekly working hours of German em-
ployees would indeed decrease if they had a Dutch Labor market. Thus,
there exists some potential for additional work-sharing in Germany. Fur-
thermore, the match between actual and desired hours of Germans would
improve if Germans faced the same hours exibility as Dutch employees.
This holds both for men and for women. Another piece of good news is
that hours restrictions shrank over time, which means, Germany seems to
be moving towards a more exible labor market.
JEL classication: J22, J23, J24.
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Non-technical summary
The lack of working hours exibility is regarded as an important hindrance for
work-sharing in Germany. Surveys show that employees often work more hours
than they actually desire to. Given these indications on hours restrictions, I
address the following questions: First, how would Germans adjust their labor
supply if the labor market were more exible? Is it likely that more work-sharing
would take place and secondly, how did the willingness to do so change from 1995
to 1998? And nally, did the mismatch between working hours preferences and
actual working hours shrink during that period or does the employers' view of
exible working time arrangement not reconcile with individual time sovereignty.
Therefore, I simulate Germans' working hours in a more exible but real world,
namely the Dutch labor market. A reduced-form labor supply model with hours
restrictions is used to describe how the working hours preferences of the Dutch
translate into their actual working hours. Applying this "Dutch model" to the
German data allows one to calculate the hypothetical labor supply of Germans
in the Dutch labor market. The fact that the German and Dutch welfare states
and labor market institutions have a number of features in common allows me to
derive implementable strategies to foster employment growth in Germany.
The results indicate that the match between actual and desired hours of Ger-
mans would improve if they faced the same hours exibility as Dutch employees.
Another piece of good news is that hours restrictions shrank over time, that is,
Germany seems to be moving towards a more exible labor market. I can show
that the gains from moving to the new situation are distributed very unevenly.
People wanting to work part-time would face a much higher probability of realiz-
ing their preferences if they had a Dutch labor market. Thus, there exists some
potential for additional work-sharing in Germany. However, women who want to
work full-time are more likely to be underemployed. On average, people would
adjust their working hours towards a shorter work week. Thus, work could be
shared among more individuals, both in 1995 and 1998. However, the employ-
ment eects are expected to be smaller compared to estimates ignoring the fact
that certain working hours preferences are hardly feasible.
Even if the derivation of expected employment eects is very tempting, this ven-
ture is doomed to failure. Working hours and workers are not perfect substitutes
and rms do not necessarily replace the individual reduction of weekly working
hours by additional employees. Therefore, I will elaborate conditions under which
the employment eects out of increasing hours exibility could be maximized and
derive some policy implications.
1 Introduction
An increasing exibility of working hours has become an often discussed means
of reducing unemployment in Germany. Surveys show that employees often work
more hours than they actually prefer, thus there seem to be a willingness to
share work among more heads. Advocates of this idea presume that more work-
sharing would take place if hours restrictions were loosened and people could
freely adjust their working hours, that is to work part-time or to arrange any
other exible time schedule. The Netherlands, often used as a good example
of working hours exibility, used to have a pretty high unemployment rate. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, as a result of various shocks and failed policies, the
Dutch economy performed signicantly worse than other European countries.
In 1982, a more supply-oriented approach of economic policy was put through.
An important element of the new strategy was an agreement between employers
and trade unions, the so-called "Wassenaar agreement", on wage moderation
combined with a reduction in working time. Meanwhile, the share of part-time
work has increased substantially and the unemployment problem is moderate. In
contrast, Germans' unemployment rate increased in the mid 80s and especially
after the German unication. Thus, it is argued that this "therapy" might also be
successful in Germany (Stille, 1998; Werner, 1997; Seifert, 2000). In this paper,
I investigate the eects of increasing hours exibility - the heart of the "Dutch
model" - on the German labor market.
There already exist some empirical studies on hours restrictions and employment
in Germany. Holst and Schupp (1994, 1998) compare the contractual and desired
working hours of German employees in 1993 and 1997. The results for 1993 in-
dicate that the majority of the employees is overemployed whereas in 1997 the
share of people who want to expand their labor supply increased. This trend
can be broken down into dierent eects. Firstly, contractual working hours de-
creased over time. Secondly, the share of full-time employees who want to work
more than 40 hours increased. But, at the same time we observe an increasing
number of full-time employees who prefer to work 30 or less hours (Holst and
Schupp, 1998). Thus, their results are strongly driven by full-time employees
who wish to work more than their contractual hours. Taking into account that
many employees work overtime, the question arises, whether in this context con-
tractual hours are the appropriate measure. Looking at actual working hours
instead, the share of people who want to expand their labor supply is much
smaller. Furthermore, the increasing preference for part-time work, especially
among West German men, suggests that there still exists some potential for ad-
ditional work sharing. Schilling et al. (1996) go one step further. Based on the
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deviation between contractual and desired hours they estimate that full-time em-
ployment could increase by 2.6 million people in 1995 if all employees work their
desired hours and the surplus hours are shared among unemployed. For women,
however, the employment eect of loosening hours restrictions is supposed to be
tiny (Beckmann, 1997). However, these estimations are based on the fallacy that
the amount of labor input required to produce a xed volume of output can be
shared between employed and currently unemployed persons. The latest studies
mainly refer to the employment eects of cutting back overtime hours (Bauer
and Zimmermann, 1999; Gro et al., 1999).
Dierent studies for various countries come to the conclusion that hours restric-
tions prevent people from working part-time (Ilmakunnas and Pudney, 1990;
Dickens and Lundberg, 1993; van Soest, 1995; Aaberge et al., 1997; Euwals and
van Soest, 1999). Several studies show that allowing for hours restrictions in
a discrete family labor supply model for West Germany reduces the estimated
wage elasticities substantially (van Soest, 1995; Wolf, 1998). That is to say, hours
restrictions do matter.
Given these indications on hours restrictions, I address the following questions:
First, how would Germans adjust their labor supply if the labor market were
more exible? Is it likely that more work-sharing would take place and secondly,
how does the willingness to do so change from 1995 to 1998? Did the so-called
"overemployment" of German employees in the mid 90s indeed fade away? And
nally, did the mismatch between working hours preferences and actual working
hours shrink during that period or does the employers' view of exible working
time arrangement not reconcile with individual time sovereignty.
A simple but naive way to answer these questions would be to approximate
the outcome in the exible world using the desired labor supply (Schilling et al.,
1996). Presumably this result is not realistic, because even in a very exible labor
market there will exist hours restrictions for certain occupations and individuals.
The probability of actually reducing the weekly working hours depends strongly
upon occupation and other individual characteristics. A manager will nd it dif-
cult to reduce his eort to 20 hours per week whereas a factory worker would
not nd a job with contractual hours allowing more than 40 hours. Additionally,
specic skills or a certain amount of rm-specic human capital might increase
the probability that an employee can arrange an individual schedule. Simply
using the desired working hours as a proxy for the labor supply in a world with
no or fewer hours restrictions would completely ignore these occupation-specic
restrictions. There might be a certain potential to reduce the weekly working
hours in some occupations if desired. But, very little is known about the fea-
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sible level of hours exibility in Germany, and there is no empirical analysis of
the expected adjustment of working hours if labor market exibility increased.
Therefore, based on the Germans' working hours preferences in 1995 and 1998, I
simulate their labor supply in an actually existing world, namely the labor market
in the Netherlands. The results of this exercise are very revealing, because the
Netherlands is well known for its high degree of work sharing and labor market
exibility. Since the German and Dutch welfare states and labor market institu-
tions have a number of features in common (Meerendonk, 1998), an important
condition for a meaningful simulation is satised. Furthermore, given the com-
parable institutional settings, using the Netherlands as a benchmark case allows
me to derive implementable strategies to foster employment growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Firstly, I give a brief survey
of the dierences between the German and Dutch employment system. In section
3, I describe the German and the Dutch data and section 4 outlines some gures
on the actual and desired working hours. The reduced-form labor supply model
with hours restrictions is described in section 5. Section 6 gives simulations of
loosening the hours constraints on the distribution of weekly working hours in
Germany and the gap between actual and desired working hours. Conclusions
and policy implications are derived in section 7.
2 German and Dutch employment systems and
economic structure in comparative perspec-
tives
The Dutch political economy is institutionally similar to the German one in sev-
eral key aspects. But, these similarities hide an important set of dierences (Sos-
kice et al., 1998). Before looking at the data, I will therefore give a brief overview
of the dierent aspects of the employment systems, aecting the distribution of
working hours and working hours exibility.
2.1 Unions and wages
Wage level, structure and exibility are the major determinants for balancing
the labor market. In both countries, pay negotiations take place on the industry
level and agreements are universally binding. The main dierence to the German
collective bargaining system is the Dutch tradition of consensual decision making
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between unions, employers and the government. According to the German Con-
stitution, government was never able to directly interfere in the process of collec-
tive bargaining between employers and employees. Furthermore, trade unions in
the Netherlands are more fragmented and decentralized than in Germany, where
more centralized unions acquire greater bargaining power. In addition, unions
density in the Netherlands fell dramatically since the early 80s. Also German
unions experienced shrinking membership. German Unication caused a strong
increase in the number of members at the beginning of the 1990s, but since 1992
unions have experienced an even stronger slump in membership (Fitzenberger
et al., 1999). However, this trend was more pronounced in the Netherlands and
started about a decade earlier. Even though it should be noted that in both coun-
tries pay agreements are to a considerable extent applied to non union members
(Schettkat, 2000).
The Dutch wage setting institutions generated very moderate growth throughout
the 1980s and 90s. The two most important reasons are rstly, the fading power
of the unions and secondly, the "Wassenar agreement", which launched the end
of wage adjustment to the price level ("Scala Mobile") and the agreement - to a
certain extent brought about by the government - on moderate wage policy.
Empirical research points to a comparable level of wage exibility in Germany
and the Netherlands (Blanchower and Oswald, 1995). In contrast to the trend in
the United States and the United Kingdom, earnings dispersion in Germany and
the Netherlands has been rather stable since the beginning of the 80s (OECD,
1996). Only a closer inspection reveals small changes in the wage distribution
(see Fitzenberger (1999) for Germany and Salverda (1998) for the Netherlands).
2.2 Recent trends in working-time policy
The decline in average working hours started about a century ago and seems
to have slowed down in most of the OECD countries (OECD, 1998bb). In the
Netherlands, working-time reductions were mainly implemented by giving addi-
tional unscheduled holiday, so-called ADV-days, to the workers. In the Wassenar
agreement the unions gave up their resistance to part-time jobs.
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Since 1985,
working time reductions have been gradually abandoned by the labor unions and
the political parties. In contrast, unions' claims for further reductions of stan-
dard working hours are up every now and then in Germany. The latest claim
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Soskice et al. (1998) argue that the increasing exibility of individual labor contracts is
partly attributed to the relative weakness of Dutch unions.
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for further hours reduction was the 32-hours week of the IG Metall in 1999. How-
ever, even in Germany, the support for further reductions of standard working
hours is shrinking and in fact the latest collective agreement for employees in
the metal industry agreed to remain with the 35-hours week in West Germany
(WSI-Tarifarchiv). Neubourg (1991) provides three major reasons for turning
away from collective working hours reductions in the Netherlands, which also
apply to the German case. Firstly, the actual employment eects remained far
behind the expectations.
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Secondly, ination during the 80s was very moderate
in both countries. Since working time reductions were to be nanced by real wage
rigidity, further reductions would result either in nominal wage cuts or increasing
labor cuts. Last but not least, worker's support for further reductions and re-
lated wage cuts declined, in particular because of the disappointing employment
eects.
Meanwhile, employers increasingly emphasize the aspect of working hours exibil-
ity. In Germany, employers in the steel industry are allowed to use more exible
working hours arrangements in exchange for the latest working hours reduction
in 1995. Also in other industries, the use of non-standard working hours and
exible employment arrangements, such as xed-term contracts and temporary
workers, increased steadily (Keller, 1997).
2.3 Social Security Systems
Social security systems may aect the distribution of working hours in two dier-
ent ways. Firstly, the method of nancing determines the non-wage labor costs if
contributions depend upon hours worked or earnings. This may aect the labor
demand for jobs with certain working hours. Secondly, the conditions of enti-
tlement and the amount of benets involve incentives on the supply of labor.
For example, eligibility or the amount of individual benets may shrink, once
earnings are below a lower earnings limit or the past employment periods are too
short.
In Germany, generally speaking, without former contributions there is no right
to receive benets in case of illness, unemployment, maternity leave, injuries
2
See Neubourg (1991), Konig and Pohlmeier (1988), Franz (1997) and Hunt (1999). Kapteyn
et al. (2000) considered both the theoretical and the international empirical literature on work-
sharing as a policy to promote employment. They conclude that if one wants to increase
employment, other measures than work-sharing are probably much more eective. Even though,
they argue that allowing for shorter hours at an individual level, that is exible working hours
arrangements, may be welfare enhancing.
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from work, invalidity or retirement. People who are not entitled to these social
security benets are supported by social welfare, which is supposed to guarantee
the subsistence level. All employees in the private or public sector whose earnings
exceed the lower earning limit are subject to the social security contributions,
which are a xed percentage of gross earnings. That is, apart from the so-called
"marginal jobs", contributions and benets of the German social security system
are fully related to income. The scheme provides little incentive for employees
to deviate from the standard full-time hours, because the reduced benets, i.e
old-age pension, are too low to live on.
In contrast, in the Netherlands there exists a general social security system for all
individuals on top of that, a separate insurance for employees. Accordingly, the
general system is nanced by taxes, to be precise, contributions to the retirement
insurance are incorporated into the rst bracket of income tax, which applies to
the rst earned guilder.
One crucial factor with respect to the impact of social security benets on labor
supply is whether they depend upon the previous employment status. According
to that, the Dutch scheme is the most favorable system for part-time employees
(Ginn and Arber, 1998). Only the illness and unemployment insurance are -
nanced by contributions from employees and employers for the most part. The
German pension system is more orientated towards continuous full-time employ-
ment, resulting in signicant smaller benets for part-time employees. Employ-
ment breaks in order to raise children are taken into account to some extent. In
general, the German model does not assure suÆcient social security of long-term
part-time employees. Summing up, the work-related social security scheme in
Germany is likely to induce working more hours.
Concerning entitlement and the amount of benets, the Netherlands experienced
a major restructuring of the disability benet system in 1987. The main objective
was to cut the benet from a maximum of 80 percent of the previous wage to 70
percent and to reduce the inow into disability. Disabled persons younger than
50 years were re-examined on the basis of a more stringent medical denition of
disability. Furthermore, employers who hire a disabled can get a wage subsidy of
up to 25 percent of the gross wage during four years. These measures increased
the incentive to supply labor, even for short hours, and clearly contributed to the
Dutch employment miracle (Nickell and Ours, 2000).
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2.4 Active labor market policy
During the 1990s, active labor market policy was seen as a leading role in com-
bating unemployment (OECD, 1995). These measures aim to increase the match
between labor demand and labor supply by means of training programs, infor-
mation about vacancies or wage subsidies, in some cases as part of a job-creation
program. In the Netherlands, expenditures for such programs as a percentage
of GDP increased from 1.1 % in 1995 to 1.8 % in 1999 (OECD, 2000). During
the rst half of the 1990s, Germany constantly spent more of the GDP on em-
ployment promotion measures (OECD, 1996). However, this activity was mainly
caused by the German unication and the corresponding training requirements.
Since 1996, the Netherlands has spent a higher percentage of GDP on active labor
market policies. Both countries reorganized the structure in favor of job-creation
programs in the second half of the 1990s.
But higher expenditures do not necessarily mean higher employment. There exist
good arguments to support the view that rising expenditures on active labor
market policy may lead to higher unemployment. Whether theses measures have
actually contributed decisively to employment growth in the Netherlands is rather
doubtful. In both countries, the empirical evidence concerning the employment
eects of training and job-creation programs is sobering (see the survey in Hagen
and Steiner (2000) for Germany and de Koning (1995) for the Netherlands).
The total unemployment rate in 1994 was 7.2 percent in the Netherlands and
8.4 percent in Germany - hiding strong dierences between East and West Ger-
many. Taking into account the hidden unemployment rate, that is people in
active employment programs, further increases the gap between Germany and
the Netherlands. In 1994, 2.5 percent of the Dutch labor force entered labor
market programs, the corresponding gure for Germany was 4 percent, though it
should be noted that this gure is strongly driven by specic programs for East
Germany (OECD, 1996). Since 1995, the Dutch Minister of Social Aairs and
Employment Melkert created various programs to create new subsidized jobs for
long-term unemployed. The majority of these "Melkert Jobs" are in the pub-
lic sector. Until 1997, the inow in active labor market programs exceeded 14
percent of the Dutch labor force.
Since 1996, the SPAK-program
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has been subsidising employers' contribution to
social security for low-wage workers (OECD, 1998a). As a result, labor costs of
employees earning minimum wages fell by about 11 percent. Textbook economics




However, Salverda (1999) concludes that the eects of wage subsidies on em-
ployment growth seem to be small if there are any at all. Comparable programs
have been in force before, but they performed also very poorly. Recently, also in
Germany a discussion about social security subsidies for low income employees
started. In view of the pessimistic assessment of the potential employment ef-
fects, the eectiveness of such a scheme is much disputed in both countries (see
e.g Buslei and Steiner, 1999; Bender et al., 1999 and Schupp et al., 1999).
Particular emphasis is set on the integration of young employees in the Nether-
lands. The Youth Work Guarantee Law of 1992 oered youngsters a combination
of training and work experience. In 1994, the law was replenished by a program
to train those young people who are not adequately skilled to move directly to
a permanent job. Like other training programs, the success to this scheme was
very limited. In Germany, youth unemployment rate is comparatively moderate,
because the unique vocational training system facilitates a smooth transition into
employment (Franz and Zimmermann, 1998).
2.5 Temporary worker
The use of temporary worker agencies in the Netherlands is the most extensive in
the OECD area. The use of the temporary worker provides more exibility for the
rm, not only with respect to working hours and earnings. An valuable advantage
for the enterprises is the exibility to adjust employment levels and compensation
standards during lean periods. Survey data show that the share of temporary
workers in the Netherlands (2.7 % in 1995) is about ve times higher than in
Germany (0.5 %) (Europaische Kommission, 1997). Also other regulations bring
about that the management of Dutch rms is more exible than the Germans
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and Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999) nd evidence that a higher labor market
exibility increases both the employment rate and the rate of participation in the
labor force. However, given that the share of temporary worker is still very low
in the Netherlands, I do not feel that this is the driving factor of overall hours
exibility.
2.6 Sectoral structure
An important dierence between the Dutch and German economy is the sectoral
structure. The Dutch manufacturing sector is very small compared to the German
4
According to the OECD (1998b), employment protection in Germany is classied as "high
strictness", the Dutch protection law is denoted as "medium strict".
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one. According to the Labor Force Survey, less than a quarter of the Dutch
employees worked in the manufacturing industry in the mid 90s. In contrast,
still 40 percent of the German labor force was employed in this sector (Federal
Statistical OÆce, 1998). Taking into account that the Netherlands used to be a
very traditional industrial society illustrates that the structural change is carried
out at great speed. Critics bring up the argument that employment growth in the
Netherlands is mainly driven by the increase in xed-term contracts and female
part-time employees in the service sector, which are often regarded as precarious
jobs. In 1995, almost three quarters of women in the service sector worked part-
time. Breaking down the net employment growth by sector shed more light on
this reproach. The fact that regular full-time employment increased only slightly
is mainly related to the decline of the Dutch industry sector, which falls heaviest
on full-time jobs and not to the missing creation of regular jobs in the service
sector (Schettkat, 2000).
3 Descriptions of the Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP) in 1995 and 1998 and from the Dutch OSA
5
-survey of 1994. The
GSOEP is a representative household survey for the German population con-
ducted every year since 1984 in West Germany and, since 1990, also in East
Germany. The Organization for Strategic Labour Market Research (OSA) col-
lects individual data about the labor market situation of the respondents every
two years. In principle, the OSA-data have been collected as a panel since 1985.
However, the attrition from one survey to the other is rather high.
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In both of these sets of data, I selected the labor force between 20 and 60 years.
Presumably, the determination of working hours for non-Europeans and those
working in the shing and farming sector is subject to some peculiarities. For
this reason, I exclude them from the analysis. Further, I exclude all individuals
in apprenticeship or in any other full-time education or training, because in the
OSA-data they were not asked about their desired working hours. Finally, I
exclude all self-employed and unpaid family workers because, in principle, they
should not be concerned with hours restrictions on the labor market. Since I am
interested in the deviation between actual and desired working hours, I restrict
the sample to people either working or intending to start working part-time or
5
Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeitdsmarktonderzoek.
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See "Trendrapport Aanbod van arbeid 1995", OSA, Den Haag.
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full-time. After these exclusions there remain 7400 observations in the GSOEP
of 1995, 7100 observations in 1998 and about 2830 observations in the Dutch
OSA-data.
For Germany, the information about the actual working hours refers to the ques-
tion: "How many hours per week including the overtime hours do you usually
work?" Provided that the employee can use up the excess hours of work by
taking time o in near future, I use the reported contractual working hours. If
however, overtime hours are either rewarded or not compensated at all, I use the
information about usual working hours. The exact wording of the question about
the desired working hours is: "If you could choose your working time, taking into
account that your income changes accordingly, how many hours would you like
to work per week?". The Dutch data provide exact information on contractual
working hours
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and average paid and unpaid overtime hours. Actual working
hours are dened as the sum of contractual and all overtime hours. Presumably,
this measure overrates the average working hours, because part of the reported
unpaid overtime hours may be compensated by time o. Unfortunately, the
OSA-data do not contain any question about the use of exible working hours.
The information about desired working hours is based on the question: "Imagine
that you could determine your weekly working hours, how many hours would
you arrange with your employer? Assume that your hourly wage rate would be
the same and other household members would not change their weekly working
hours." The individual dierences in the number of days of holiday and absen-
teeism are not taken into account. The distribution of actual and desired hours in
the two subsamples are considered in the next section. Table 6 in the Appendix
presents descriptive statistics of the other variables used in this study.
4 Comparing the match of desired and actual
hours in the Netherlands and in Germany
In order to give an impression of the existing hours restrictions in the Dutch
and German labor markets, I outline the mismatch between actual and desired
hours in the Netherlands and Germany in 1995 and 1998. To do so, I apply two
dierent methods, a cross table and a simple multinomial logit model.
First, I generate discrete variables of desired and actual weekly working hours.
NW denotes people who do not work. Employees working up to 20 hours are
7
I adjust the contractual weekly working hours in case people are eligible to take ADV-days,
which are additional free days apart from vacation (see section 2.2).
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grouped in the category "small part-timer" (SPT) and employees who work up
to 34 hours are dened as "extended part-timer" (EPT). Standard full-time jobs
(FT) cover the range from 35 to 40 hours per week and all jobs beyond this
threshold are called "overtime jobs" (OT). Table 1 compares the grouped vari-
ables of desired and actual weekly working hours of men and women, respectively.
I skipped the category of desired overtime hours for women due to too few ob-
servations. The gures present the percentages of individuals who fall into the
respective category of actual hours. The rst row, for example, shows the dis-
tribution of labor supply of German men and women in 1995 who do not want
to work more than 20 hours per week (the sum of the rst ve columns adds up
to 100 percent). The last row of each block exhibits the distribution of actual
working hours of men and women and the last column contains the shares of the
desired working hours for the corresponding sample.
Table 1: Desired versus actual working hours of men in Germany and the Nether-





























7.7 17.0 2.6 40.0 32.8 6.1 16.2 48.8 15.6 14.8 4.5 23.1
EPT
d
3.3 4.2 12.3 57.5 22.6 5.5 29.0 8.4 29.1 28.0 5.6 26.1
FT
d
14.3 0.7 1.0 55.7 28.3 71.2 26.4 2.6 5.2 51.2 14.6 50.8
OT
d
1.5 0.8 0.5 34.7 62.6 17.2 - - - - - -
P
2




4.9 24.6 4.9 48.6 16.9 3.9 20.7 53.9 12.7 10.6 2.1 20.5
EPT
d
5.2 2.4 11.5 65.1 15.9 6.9 26.6 8.7 29.4 31.1 4.3 28.3
FT
d
15.3 0.9 1.1 61.2 21.5 76.3 26.9 2.7 6.5 53.7 10.1 51.2
OT
d
3.0 0.9 0.6 42.6 52.9 12.9 - - - - - -
P
2




7.5 39.6 9.4 30.2 13.2 3.1 24.0 59.4 13.1 2.4 1.1 40.8
EPT
d
8.9 0.7 20.1 43.6 26.7 17.9 8.1 7.6 51.7 20.7 11.8 33.4
FT
d
6.8 0.6 1.5 52.8 38.3 71.2 14.2 4.1 8.1 58.3 15.3 25.8
OT
d
9.2 0.8 0.8 22.3 66.9 7.7 - - - - - -
P
2
7.4 1.8 5.0 48.1 37.7 100 16.2 27.8 24.7 22.9 8.3 100
Note: Subscripts d indicate categories of desired working hours (rows) and subscripts
a denote the corresponding category of actual working hours (columns);
1
distribution
of desired weekly working hours (in percent);
2
distribution of actual weekly working
hours
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1995 and 1998 for Germany and the
OSA-data for the Netherlands.
The italicized numbers on the diagonal of each block show the percentages of peo-
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ple whose desired working hours roughly match their actual labor supply, that is,
they can more or less realize their preferences.
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Even in the Netherlands, a coun-
try with very exible working hours, the t between desired and actual working
hours is not perfect. The individuals in the lower triangle are underemployed,
and those in the upper triangle would prefer to work fewer hours than they actu-
ally do. Comparing these gures reveals the dierence in the hours restrictions
between Germany and the Netherlands.
Secondly, I run a simple regression of grouped working hours on desired hours
using a multinomial logit model (Nerlove and Press, 1973). In principle, this
estimation translates the information of Table 1 into conditional probabilities.
This is very attractive, because the interpretation of the multinomial logit is
straightforward if the coeÆcients are translated into relative risk ratios. The
coeÆcients and the relative risk ratios (rrr) of the multinomial logit model are
presented in Table 2. The explanatory power (pseudo R
2
) of this model provides
a rough measure of hours constraints in Germany and the Netherlands.
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A positive coeÆcient, for instance, the eect of SPT
d
in the category of SPT
a
indicates that individuals who wish to work up to 20 hours per week have a
higher probability of realizing their preferences than ending up with a full-time
job, which is the base category of the estimation. The exponentiated value of
the coeÆcient is the relative risk ratio for one unit change in the corresponding
variable, where risk is being measured as the risk of SPT
a
relative to the base
category. For German men searching for a small part-time job in 1995 (SPT
d
), the
probability of working 20 hours or less relative to the probability of working full-
time is less than half (e
 :85
= 0:4): For Dutch women however, the probability
of getting the desired part-time job is 25 times (e
3:23
= 25:2) the probability
of working full-time. Thus, this coeÆcient can be interpreted as a measure of
restrictions faced by people who want to work very few hours.
Analogously, the negative coeÆcients of EPT
d
in the category of EPT
a
in all
three samples indicate that German and Dutch men have a lower probability of
nding the desired extended part-time job relative to a full-time job, whereas
the relative risk ratio of corresponding women in the Netherlands is just above
8
If the dierence between desired and actual working hours is not more than 1 hour per
week but the categorized variables of desired and actual hours dier, actual working hours are
replaced by desired hours. In the OSA-data, 45 observation were replaced in this way, in the
GSOEP-data only 5 observations.
9
Basically, the dependent variable is ordered, thus the multinomial logit model is not com-
pulsory. Even though, this choice seems to be attractive, because hours constraints may depend
decisively upon desired hours. Estimating dierent sets of coeÆcients for each category of actual
hours provides much exibility in order to capture these eects.
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one. This conrms that on average, Dutch people have a higher probability of
satisfying their part-time preferences than Germans. Very striking is that the
share of involuntary non-working men and women is much higher in Germany,
both in 1995 and in 1998.
Table 2: Multinomial logit model of actual working hours
men women
G (1995) G (1998) NL (1994) G (1995) G (1998) NL (1994)
choice coe rrr coe rrr coe rrr coe rrr coe rrr coe rrr





-1.65 0.2* -2.29 0.1* -1.39 0.3* 0.09 1.1 0.67 2.0* 2.32 10.2*
EPT
d
-2.86 0.1* -2.53 0.1* -1.59 0.2* 0.03 1.0 -0.16 0.9 -0.94 0.4*
FT
d
-1.36 0.3* -1.39 0.2* -2.05 0.1* -0.66 0.5* -0.69 0.5* -1.41 0.2*
OT
d
-3.14 0.0* -2.65 0.1* -0.88 0.4* - - - - - -





-0.85 0.4* -0.68 0.5* 0.27 1.3 1.19 3.3* 1.63 5.1* 3.23 25.2*
EPT
d
-2.61 0.1* -3.31 0.0* -4.19 0.0* -1.21 0.3* -1.28 0.3* -1.00 0.4*
FT
d
-4.34 0.0* -4.26 0.0* -4.51 0.0* -2.99 0.1* -2.99 0.1* -2.66 0.1*
OT
d
-3.83 0.0* -3.91 0.0* -3.37 0.0* - - - - - -





-2.75 0.1* -2.29 0.1* -1.16 0.3* 0.05 1.0 0.18 1.2 1.71 5.5*
EPT
d
-1.55 0.2* -1.73 0.2* -0.77 0.5* 0.04 1.0 -0.06 0.9 0.91 2.5*
FT
d
-4.00 0.0* -4.04 0.0* -3.56 0.0* -2.29 0.1* -2.12 0.1* -1.97 0.1*
OT
d
-4.34 0.0* -4.19 0.0* -3.37 0.0* - - - - - -





-0.20 0.8 -1.06 0.3* -0.83 0.4 -1.18 0.3* -1.61 0.2* -0.79 0.5
EPT
d
-0.93 0.4* -1.41 0.2* -0.49 0.6* -1.60 0.2* -1.98 0.1* -0.56 0.6*
FT
d
-0.68 0.5* -1.04 0.4* -0.32 0.7* -1.25 0.3* -1.67 0.2* -1.34 0.3*
OT
d
0.59 1.8* 0.22 1.2* 1.10 3.0* - - - - - -
Log likelih. -3951 -3657 -1761 -4631 -4394 -1352
Pseudo R
2
0.365 0.375 0.352 0.185 0.212 0.264
# observ. 3863 3633 1689 3531 3465 1142
Note: the base category are standard full-time hours (FT
a
); Subscripts d indicate cate-
gories of desired working hours (rows) and subscripts a denote the corresponding cate-
gory of actual working hours (columns); the stars next to the coeÆcients indicate that
the variable is signicant at the 5%-level.
Are the Dutch indeed more likely to meet their working hours preferences? Based
on these descriptive gures, this question can easily be answered. People who
state that they would like to work part-time are clearly better o in the Nether-
lands. Even if the probability of German men to meet their preference for small
part-time jobs increased form 17 % in 1995 to 24.6 % in 1998 (see Table 1), the
relative risk ratio is still much lower than in the Netherlands and still below one
(see Table 2). For men preferring an extended part-time job, the situation is
rather stable in Germany. The corresponding shares of "unconstrained" people
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are 12.3 percent in 1995 and 11.5 percent in 1998, that is half of the gure in the
Netherlands.
Furthermore, the structure of over- and underemployment diers across coun-
tries (see Table 1). Even if extended part-time jobs are more common in the
Netherlands (5.5% of all employed men), about 70 percent of all Dutch men in-
terested in these working hours indeed work more hours. In Germany, the share
of overemployment of men who want to work between 20 and 34 hours is even 80
percent. In principle, these results are very similar for women, albeit the match
between part-time preferences and actual working hours is much better. Again,
for German women the conditional probability of nding a small part-time job
increased from 49 percent in 1995 to almost 54 percent in 1998. As for men,
the relative risk of actually working part-time, given that part-time is desired,
is substantially higher in the Netherlands. Notice that Dutch women searching
for a small part-time job are 25 times more likely to meet their hours preferences
than working full-time. The corresponding risk ratio for German women is 5.1
in 1998 and only 3.3 in 1995 (see Table 2). Taking the Dutch hours exibil-
ity as a starting-point, there seems to be a considerable potential for additional
work-sharing in Germany.
These results also hold if I restrict the sample to employees (see Table 7 in the
Appendix). The last column of each block in Table 7 provides another measure
of hours restrictions, that is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) between actual
and desired working hours of German and Dutch employees. Based on these
gures, people searching for a small part time job are more restricted, because
their actual working hours are on average remoter from their preferences than
those who want to work between 20 and 34 hours.
Individuals wanting to work full-time do not necessarily have the highest chance
to meet their preferences. For men, this is only true in Germany in 1998 (see Table
1). In the year 1995 and in the Netherlands, overtime hours are very widespread,
forcing many employees to work more than they actually want to. Even though,
employees searching for a full-time job are better o in Germany and the use of
overtime work seems to be declining. In contrast, Dutch men who want to work
more than 40 hours a week have a higher chance of realizing their preferences
than Germans. This peculiarity can be partly attributed to the business cycle.
1994 was the rst boom year after a couple of years with poor growth rates. Ad-
ditionally, employment growth lags behind GDP-growth rates by about one year
(Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung,
1999). Presumably, the increasing labor demand is mainly satised by overtime
hours. This seems to aect women's working hours as well. At least, 18 percent
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of female employees in the Netherlands work more than 40 hours, although they
prefer a standard full-time job. In short, overtime work is much more common
in the Netherlands. A closer look into the data shows that this is mainly due
to the unpaid overtime hours of highly skilled employees.
10
This illustrates that,
especially in the Netherlands, the mismatch between actual and desired hours is
to some extent caused by overtime work.
The Dutch dier from the Germans not only with respect to the probability of
matching desired and actual working hours but also with respect to the desired
labor supply. 21 percent of Dutch men want to work less than 35 hours per
week. In Germany, about 11 percent of the corresponding sample is searching
for any type of part-time job. Especially extended part-time jobs are sought
more by Dutch men. For women, the dierence is even more pronounced. Three
of four Dutch women prefer to work reduced hours. In Germany, only every
second woman is willing to work part-time. Reasons for the distinctive preference
for part-time jobs in the Netherlands, such as education level and job position,
specic features of the social security and tax system as well as incentives set
by family policy, are very diverse and complex and are elaborated in detail in
Wolf and Wunderlich (2000). It can be noticed that both German women and
men show an increasing preference for extended part-time jobs. The fact that
the desired part-time share in Germany is only slightly higher than the actual
part-time rate in the Netherlands suggests that loosening the constraints on the
supply of labor in Germany could have substantial employment eects.
So far, the results can be summarized as follows:
 Men and women who state that they would like to work part-time are
clearly better o in the Netherlands.
 German men wanting to work part-time have a very low probability of
meeting their preferences. At least those searching for a small part-time
job experienced slight improvement of their match after 1995.
 The conditional probability of nding a small part-time job increased also
for German women.
10
The magnitude of unpaid overtime in the Netherlands is slightly greater than that for paid
overtime. In 1994, 30.5 percent of Dutch males and 23.2 percent of the females reported to
work unpaid overtime. These men work on average 7.5 unpaid hours per week and women
work 4.2 hours. Bell and Hart (1999) get very similar gures for the United Kingdom. In
Germany, unpaid overtime work is restricted to less employees. 11.8 (8.5) percent of the men
(women) work on average 10.5 (7.6) unpaid overtime hours per week. Note that the high share
of overtime work in the Netherlands may be also due to missing information about exible
working hours in the Dutch OSA-data (see section 3).
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 There exists a high excess-demand for extended part-time jobs among men
and women, both in Germany and the Netherlands.
 Germans searching for a job with standard full-time hours are better o
than the Dutch in 1994 and the use of overtime work is declining further in
Germany. Note that the extensive use of overtime hours in the Netherlands
can partly be attributed to the business cycle.
These results provide some evidence that in the Netherlands work-sharing is
more sought after and also takes place more frequently. On the other hand, more
employees are confronted with undesired overtime work. But, do these ndings
still hold, if we take into account individual heterogeneity? Therefore, I proceed
with a multivariate analysis of working hours in the next section.
5 Labor supply model with hours restrictions
The results in the previous section suggest that individual references on working
hours are not perfect predictors of actual labor supply. Although the mean ab-
solute deviation between actual and desired hours decreased slightly from 1995
to 1998, the mismatch of working hours is much higher in Germany compared to
the Netherlands (see Table 7 in the Appendix). Due to the higher unemployment
rate in Germany, the dierence is especially pronounced if people out of work are
taken into account. It is clear that restricting the sample to employees decreases
the distance between desired and actual working hours in both countries (see Ta-
ble 6 in the Appendix). Even though, the gap between wish and reality is higher
in Germany.
5.1 Specication of the model
In general, working hours are derived from a utility function which depends upon
leisure (l) and income (y).
U = U(l; y)
In the standard labor supply model, the individual wage rate is assumed to be the
same across jobs. Thus, jobs are dened only by their working hours. This implies
that all jobs with a given amount of working hours provide the same income and
therefore the same utility to an individual. Within this framework, any deviation
between desired and actual working hours indicates that an employee cannot nd
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a job with the desired working hours, even if he or she would be willing to change
their occupation or to move to another region. Obviously, this interpretation of
the dierence between desired and actual working hours is too strict.
Firstly, the individual wage rate is not the same across jobs. Previous stud-
ies show that switching to a job with very few hours causes a reduction in the
hourly wage rate and might have negative implications on the future returns to
experience (Wolf, 2000; Tummers and Woittiez, 1991). The assignment model
attributes wage dierentials to the varying skills required for dierent jobs. The
better the match between the individual abilities and the demands on the job,
the higher the productivity of the employee (see for example the survey of Sat-
tinger, 1993). Secondly, people choose their jobs not only according to contrac-
tual working hours, but also to the type of activity performed as well as to other
characteristics of the rm, such as location or size. If for example, a wife is
not mobile because her husband does not want to quit his job, the location of
the rm may be more important than the oered working hours or wages. And
thirdly, hours constraints on the supply of labor may cause the gap between de-
sired and actual working hours. For instance, a high-skilled manager would have
diÆculties nding an appropriate part-time job, because dividing this type of job
among numerous part-time employees is considered as diÆcult and costly. Apart
from the occupation and the skill level, the exibility of working hours may dier
among sectors and rm sizes. As a result, characteristics of the labor demand
are important to understand the distribution of actual working hours.
In this setting, it is less likely that employees nd a perfect match between actual
and desired working hours. Given that there exist a limited number of jobs with
a xed set of characteristics, the probability that an individual can realize his
or her preferences decreases with the number of relevant job characteristics. If
the optimal job is not available, people must accept second or third-best choices.
Depending on their preferences and the availability of other job characteristics, a
person might either switch to another occupation or location, accept a wage cut.
Finally, the individual may decide to work additional or reduced hours in order
to meet its preferences about one of the other relevant job characteristics. This
framework oers a variety of explanations for the deviation between actual and
desired working hours.
To capture the supply and demand-side eects, I use a reduced form model of
labor supply with hours restrictions. As explanatory variables I select individual
characteristics which determine either the ordering of the preferences or the avail-
ability of jobs with certain sets of characteristics. I use desired working hours as
a measure of the rst-choice labor supply. If this variable successfully predicted
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actual labor supply, one can conclude that either the hours restrictions do not
matter or that individuals choose their job mainly based upon working hours.
Given the results in Table 1 and 2, this is not very likely. Thus, I use additional
variables which determine the preference order, such as the skill level, general
and specic human capital and information about the household context.
On the one hand, previous investment in human capital as a proxy for the wage
rate might determine whether the constrained people reduce or expand their
labor supply compared to their reported rst choice. If desired hours cannot
be realized, highly educated people at the upper tail of the wage distribution
are more likely to work more hours than desired and therefore buy domestic
services to increase their leisure
11
. The outsourcing of domestic services is utility
maximizing, if the hourly wage rate exceeds the price the purchased services. On
the other hand, innovative and exible working hours arrangements for highly
skilled workers with management functions are not very common in German rms
yet. Thus, the distribution of available working hours is much tighter for highly
skilled sta compared to low skilled workers. The probability of weekly working
hours at the left tail of the distribution, that is part-time work, is expected to
be much lower. If however, the rm has to cope with labor shortage for specic
occupations of high-skilled employees, such as IT-experts, the employer might
fear that the applicant will quit the job if they don't arrange a part-time job.
The same should be true for employees who are broadly trained by the rm or
have accumulated comprehensive rm-specic human capital. Depending on rm
size, organizational structure and other factors, the management may decide to
reorganize labor and implement exible working hours.
The marital status and the presence of children primarily aect the adjustment
of the labor supply of women. Especially mothers of small children presumably
choose a job with fewer hours if they cannot match their preferences, because an
expansion of their labor supply may cause substantial costs, such as private child
care. Nevertheless, demand-side eects may enhance the chance of mothers to
get a part-time job, because employers know that part-time employment often is
the only possibility to reconcile paid work and family. Many managers still think
that people's desire to work part-time signals less motivation and thus lower
productivity. Apart from mothers' responsibility to care for their children, they
hardly support other motives to reduce standard working hours.
Firms might support part-time work for old aged employees, because it is an easy
11
In most empirical studies, leisure is dened by the dierence between a total amount of
available hours per week minus the weekly working hours. However, this measure includes
activities, which are not necessarily leisure, for instance, commuting time or cleaning.
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way to displace expensive but on average less productive workers. In Germany,
a labor market policy called "Altersteilzeitgesetz" provides additional incentives
to implement part-time jobs for employees older than 55 years. However, such
a law did not exist in the Netherlands in 1994. As a result, age eects turned
out to be minor in the Netherlands and are therefore dropped in the empirical
approach.
Since the exibility of working hours diers tremendously among dierent oc-
cupations, I use several dummy variables and interactions between occupation
dummies and desired working hours to capture the availability of jobs with cer-
tain working hours.
12
Presumably, the working hours distribution of salespersons
or employees in the service sector are substantially more dispersed than the ac-
tual working hours of professionals or managerial employees. Irrespective of the
occupation, one should expect a higher working hours exibility for temporary
workers, which is a fairly large group in the Netherlands. However, due to the
limited number of observations, I do not nd robust evidence for this hypothesis.
It would be straightforward to estimate this reduced form model of labor supply
with hours restrictions by extending the multinomial logit model presented in
section 4. However, this model bears some risk of misspecication, because a
stringent assumption of the multinomial logit approach is that the choice model
satises the property of independent alternatives (IIA). In a word, this condition
requires that the exclusion of categories does not aect the relative risks associ-
ated with the regressors in the remaining categories, that is, alternatives should
be similarly close to each other. This assumption may be violated in our case,
because working overtime hours is a closer substitute to working full-time than it
is to not working at all. I test the IIA-condition applying a Hausman specication
test (Hausman, 1978) for all possible exclusions of categories, these are ve tests
for each, men's and women's model. For men, three of ve tests fail, indicating
that the model does not meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test.
For women, only one out of ve tests fails. But, during the research it turned out
that adding more explanatory variables to the female model reinforces misspec-
ication.
13
Another shortcoming of the logit approach is that I drop available
information by grouping the data. Therefore, I give up the discrete choice model
and conne myself to a continuous OLS model.
As starting-point of the empirical model on actual weekly working hours (AH),
12
To create comparable occupational groups I use the International Standard Classication
of Occupations (ISCO-88).
13
This is true despite the exclusion of people out of work. Thus, even a nested logit model
would not be appropriate.
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describes a polynomial of degree I of desired working hours
and schooling, experience and tenure capture the human capital endowment of
the individual. The household context is described by a dummy variable for mar-
ried people (MS) and the number of children under age 16 living in the household
(kids). occup
j
denotes occupational dummy variables, where J is the number of
categories. The current occupation involves some risk of endogeneity, because
it might be selected based upon the occupation-specic distribution of working
hours. Since I also include the information about the desired working hours,
the eect of the occupational dummies can be interpreted as the availability of
certain working hours for dierent jobs.
I also checked for rm size and regional eects. The corresponding coeÆcients
were not signicant and therefore not used in the later simulations. As the de-
pendent variable, I use actual weekly working hours including all overtime hours,
irrespective of whether they are paid or not. I estimate this model separately
for men and women based on the Dutch OSA-data. Because information about
previous jobs of non-active people is incomplete, I restrict the samples to actually
employed people.
5.2 Some remarks about the endogeneity of working hours
preferences
Using reported preferences on working hours as explanatory variable in the hours
model is unorthodox for economists and involves some risk of endogeneity. Firstly,
because desired hours may be contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance.
In order to receive consistent results, an instrumental variable estimator may
14
In order to avoid the potential endogeneity of desired working hours, one may suggest to
use the gap between actual and desired hours (AH  DH) as exogenous variable. Supposing
that restrictions depend decisively upon the desired labor supply, I give preferences to the
specication described above.
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be required. That is, an alternative (set of) independent variable(s) which is
(are) correlated with the original explanatory variable and contemporaneously
uncorrelated with the disturbance must be found. However, in this case it is
extraordinarily diÆcult to nd good instrumental variables. On the one hand,
standard variables in labor supply models do not capture short-term or transitory
changes in desired working hours, for example triggered by participation in further
education or caring for a parent. Thus, the resulting model of working hours
with hours restrictions would not be able to capture the actual adaptability of
working hours in the Dutch economy. On the other hand, potential instrumental
variables, such as education level or the number of children in the household are
not appropriate, because they are not independent of the disturbance either. If
however, the instrument is only weakly correlated with actual working hours,
the IV-approach can produce biased estimates as well (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
Therefore, I refrain from using instrumental variables.
Secondly, working hours preferences may be inuenced by the actual degree of
working hours exibility. There exists some evidence indicating that the de-
mand for a certain good is also determined by the aggregate consumption of this
good. Desired working hours might be inuenced by the national distribution of
the working hours (Alessie and Kapteyn, 1991). Accordingly, Holst and Schupp
(1998) argue that the striking increase in desired part-time work after 1994 may
be attributed to the reduced working hours of 28.8 hours per week at the VW
group. As a result, one should reckon in that the distribution of desired working
hours becomes more dispersed if more exibility takes place. Even more people
would like to work fewer hours. In order to allow for interdependent preferences,
additional information about habit formation would be necessary. However, there
is no reliable information about the potential shift of hours preferences due to
an increasing exibility of working hours. Thus, in this paper I assume that the
preferences are independent of the aggregate labor supply in the short run.
5.3 A brief discussion of the estimation results
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the reduced-form labor supply model
for men and women in the Netherlands. Due to the correlation between reported
hours preferences and individual characteristics, which also determine the labor
supply decision, coeÆcients should not be interpreted separately. Apart from
that, the eects of all explanatory variables cannot be clearly attributed to either
the supply or the demand side. Therefore, the interpretation of the coeÆcients
is not straightforward and I do not go into a detailed analysis of their eects.
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Table 3: OLS regression of actual weekly working hours, Netherlands
men women
coef. t-value coef. t-value
constant  2; 886  0:37 5:980 1:96
DH 1:876 4:12  0:073  0:18
DH
2
/100  2:245  3:30 5:587 3:17
DH
3
/1000      0:924  3:85
schooling 0:120 2:16 0:335 4:29
tenure 0:246 4:49    
tenure
2
/100  0:549  4:32    
experience     0:021 2:60
experience
2
/100     0:005  1:88
kids in the household      1:642  3:36
married      1:054  1:97
civil servant  1:146  2:74    
manager 53:184 4:47  33:167  2:21
manager  DH  2:479  3:83 5:747 2:65
manager  DH
2
/100 3:168 3:53  24:132  2:54
manager  DH
3
/1000     2:980 2:32
professional 37:571 3:77 96:863 2:69
professional  DH  2:049  3:64  11:241  2:62
professional  DH
2
/100 2:969 3:64 39:541 2:42
professional DH
3
/1000      4:307  2:17
teacher/nurse  1:070  0:11  2:469  3:89
teacher/nurse DH  0:149  0:26    
teacher/nurse DH
2
/100 0:636 0:73    
technician 19:005 1:93 1:193 1:59
technician  DH  1:331  2:42    
technician  DH
2
/100 2:287 2:90    
service worker 13:857 1:37  2:609  4:50
service worker  DH  1:131  2:05    
service worker  DH
2
/100 2:069 2:68    
production worker 22:447 2:59  0:026  0:02
production worker  DH  1:486  3:02    
production worker DH
2




# of observations 1557 952
Note: DH: desired weekly working hours.
Source: Own calculations based on the OSA-data for the Netherlands.
22
For men, a quadratic function of desired hours (DH) is used to capture the im-
pact of desired on actual working hours whereas for women, a cubic specication
was more appropriate. The eect of desired working hours on actual hours dif-
fers among the occupational groups. For example, working hours preferences of
male managers seem not to be reected in their actual working hours. Their
predicted working hours vary between 40 and 45 hours per week, irrespective of
their preferences. Also for male professionals, the relation between desired and
actual working hours is fairly weak. In contrast, the predicted working hours of
female managers and professionals
15
do not deviate that much from their reported
preferences. Among men, clerks and service workers exhibit the best t between
desired and actual working hours. This result is consistent with the observation
that these activities are in general easy to share among dierent employees.
All sorts of human capital increase the number of working hours, whereas tenure
within the same rm is not signicant for women and labor market experience
has no eect on the actual working hours of men. This result supports the above
mentioned hypothesis that highly skilled people are more likely to work more
hours, either because they can aord to buy domestic services or because of
distinctive hours restrictions for part-time jobs.
Both married women and mothers of children up to 16 year work signicantly
less hours per week, even if desired hours are controlled for. This points to the
strong tradition of reduced working hours of Dutch mothers. However, the loose
labor market attachment of women with small children may be partly attributed
to the shortage of child care facilities in the Netherlands.
16
For men, the marital
status and children turned out to be insignicant. The result that male civil
servants work fewer hours than employees in the private sector, everything else
being equal, may be driven by the "Melkert-jobs", which are generally nanced
for a 32-hour job in the public sector (see section 2.4).
6 Inference from the estimation results
Based on these estimation results, I simulate Germans' labor supply in 1995 and
1998 under the assumption that they face the same conditional hours distribution
15
Given that desired hours are at least 15 hours per week.
16
In regard to public child care facilities, the Netherlands falls far behind Germany. In
Germany, 79 of 100 children between 3 and 6 years are in public child care. In the Netherlands,
the comparable number is 55 children (Veil, 1997). During the period from 1990 to 1995, local
governments created more child care facilities, which are partly hired or bought by employers.
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as Dutch employees in 1994. The postponement of one year need not prevent us
from using this situation as a reference point. Even though one should keep in
mind that the economic upturn in the Netherlands started exactly in that year.
Technically speaking, I apply the "Dutch model" to the German data. Conse-
quently, the predicted labor supply is based on Germans' individual character-
istics and hours preferences and Dutch working hours distribution, which again
depends upon the Dutch labor demand and the exibility of adjusting working
hours.
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By simulating the labor supply of Germans in an environment with fewer hours
restrictions, namely the Netherlands, I can address three questions. Firstly, how
does the higher exibility of working hours change work-sharing in Germany in
1995 and 1998? Taking into account that desired working hours have risen since
1995, the eects of loosening hours constraints in later years may be a little
smaller. Secondly, to what extent does the match between desired and actual
working hours improve? And thirdly, who are the chief beneciaries of changing
the conditional distribution of working hours?
6.1 Changing distribution of working hours
The labor supply model with hours restrictions for the Netherlands describes how
the working hours preferences translate into the actual labor supply. Applying
the "Dutch model" to the German data allows to calculate the hypothetical
labor supply of Germans, if they had a Dutch labor market. To put it dierently,
based on Germans' individual characteristics and working hours preferences, I
predict their expected working hours using the coeÆcients of the Dutch labor
supply model with hours restriction. To check whether the Dutch labor market
exibility would allow more work-sharing in Germany, I compare the actual with
the simulated hours distribution. Figure 1 presents kernel estimations of actual
and simulated working hours of German men and women in 1995 and 1998. Note
that ignoring the feedback mechanism of increasing hours exibility on reported
working hours preferences (see section 5.2) provides a rather conservative estimate
of the predicted change in actual working hours in Germany.
17
Note that this simulated outcome also includes the employment eect due to the dierence
in the tax and social secutity systems. However, this eect seems to be minor (Vlasblom,
1997). Based on the GSOEP and the OSA-data of previous years he shows that the dierence
in female working hours between the two countries would increase only slightly if the systems
were equal. Furthermore, the contribution of the tax system to explain the dierences in female
labor supply is decreasing over time. In addition to that, incentives set by the welfare state
should be reected by individual preferences, which I control for.
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Figure 1: Actual and simulated working hours of German men and women
MEN WOMEN
Applying the conditional working hours distribution of Dutch men to German
men seems to cause unwanted eects. The peak of the distribution is shifted to
the right, indicating that more men would work overtime hours. Furthermore,
the increase of part-time jobs is fairly small. However, the accumulation of em-
ployees at the right tail of the distribution disappears in the simulated situation.
Consequently, it is not straightforward whether the "Dutch model" would en-
able additional work sharing for German men. The results are less ambiguous
for women. While the distribution of part-time jobs up to 20 hours is aected
only slightly, jobs between 21 and 36 hours become much more frequent. The
peak of the simulated hours is at 35 hours per week, that is 3 hours less than
the peak of the actual hours distribution of female employees in 1995 and 1998.
This is presumably due to the fact that in Germany part-time work is especially
sought-after by women. Taking into account that actual working hours tend to
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be overrated in the Dutch data, these results suppose that there exists some
potential for additional work-sharing among women.
Another way to illustrate the eect of loosening hours constraints on the supply
of labor in Germany is to calculate the change in the expected value of weekly
working hours. The average weekly working hours of German men would drop
by 1.5 hours in 1995, which is mainly driven by men who want to work up to 20
hours per week. The "Dutch model" would allow them to reduce their weekly
working hours by about 10 hours. The adjustment of men wanting to work more
hours is much smaller, albeit the average change in working hours is still negative.
In 1998, the average working hours of men would be unaected by switching to
the "Dutch model". However, men with a strong taste for leisure could again
reduce their working hours in the desired way. It follows from this that at least
in 1995, there existed some potential for additional work sharing among men.
For women, average working hours would drop almost 4 hours per week in 1995
and at least 2.2 hours in 1998. Again, the reduction is mainly driven by women
who are seeking a small part-time job.
6.2 Eects on the gap between desired and simulated
working hours
The fact that the distribution of simulated working hours of German women has
shifted to the left does not necessarily imply that women would be less constrained
in the new situation. Also for men, it is not straightforwardly apparent how the
"Dutch model" would aect their match between actual and desired hours. To
verify whether the match improves or not, I compare the individual probabilities
that an individual can realize his or her preferences in the two situations. There-
fore, I calculate the change in the mean absolute deviation between desired and
actual respectively simulated hours (MAD).
Table 4 presents the mean absolute deviations of men and women in the dierent
regimes and the MAD. In order to get more insight into the various dierent
eects, I divide the sample by desired working hours and occupations. A piece
of good news is that the gap between desired and actual weekly working hours
would shrink, both for men and women. However, the gain from switching to
the "Dutch model" was much bigger in 1995 compared to 1998. This result
may indicate that concerning working hours exibility, Germany has indeed been
behind the Netherlands for more than four years, however, we seem to be on the
right way.
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MEN all 5.0 3.9  1:1 4.0 3.6  0:3
SPT
d
28.4 17.6  10:8 21.1 15.5  5:7
EPT
d
9.4 7.7  1:8 8.5 7.6  0:9
FT
d
3.2 2.5  0:6 2.5 2.6 +0:1
OT
d
2.6 3.3 +0:7 4.2 3.3  0:9
manager 8.0 8.0 0:0 7.4 7.6 +0:2
professional 5.3 5.5 0:2 4.8 5.4 +0:6
teacher/nurses 4.7 4.7 0:0 5.1 4.9  0:2
technician 4.3 3.2  1:1 3.3 3.3 0:0
clerks 4.1 3.2  0:9 3.5 3.2  0:3
service worker 4.1 2.8  1:3 2.7 2.7 0:0
prod. worker 4.8 3.3  1:5 3.7 2.9  0:8
WOMEN all 4.4 3.5  0:9 3.4 3.1  0:3
SPT
d
9.9 2.7  7:3 6.6 2.6  4:0
EPT
d
3.4 2.2  1:2 3.1 2.5  0:7
FT
d
2.3 4.6 +2:3 2.2 3.7 +1:6
manager 8.2 4.2  4:0 5.8 3.0  2:8
professional 4.1 4.2 0:1 4.2 5.2 +1:0
teacher/nurses 4.8 3.5  1:3 3.0 2.6  0:4
technician 5.1 3.6  1:5 3.9 3.5  0:4
clerks 3.9 3.1  0:8 3.0 2.6  0:3
service worker 4.5 3.5  1:0 3.2 3.4 +0:1
prod. worker 3.8 4.1 0:3 3.5 2.8  0:7
Note:
1
mean absolute deviation between desired and actual working hours in the
corresponding year;
2
mean absolute deviation between desired and simulated working
hours in the corresponding year.
Source: Own calculations based on the estimation results presented in Table 3.
On the assumption that Germany had the same working hours exibility as the
Netherlands, one can show that people wanting to work part-time have a much
higher probability of realizing their preferences. Especially men and women want-
ing to work up to 20 hours per week exhibit by far the worst match between
actual and desired working hours. In the simulated situation, they would have
the opportunity to adjust their labor supply in the desired way. In addition, the
availability of extended part-time jobs improves. This indicates that the Dutch
working hours exibility would permit more work-sharing in Germany.
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On the other hand, women who want to work full-time hours are more likely to
be worse o, because full-time work and of course overtime hours for women are
rather exceptional in the Dutch economy. In 1995, the MAD of women wanting
to work between 35 and 40 hours would rise 2.3 hours per week, in 1998 still
1.6 hours. This phenomenon can be partly attributed to the strong Christian
tradition in the Netherlands: traditional family values are deeply rooted. It was
not until the 80s that Dutch women stayed in the labor market after marriage.
Nowadays, they typically remain in continuous part-time employment (Fagan
et al., 1999). Apart from that, missing child care facilities prevent women from
working full-time.
Breaking down the seven occupational groups reveals signicant dierences. In
all sub-samples, managers are the most constrained with respect to their working
hours. Very striking is the improved match between actual and desired hours for
female managers. Thus, there exists some potential for reorganizing managerial
activities. Does this result unsettle the myth of indivisible jobs? Unfortunately,
men's gures do not really support this supposition. Also male managers show
the biggest gap between actual and desired working hours, however the switch
to the "Dutch model" would not improve their situation. One explanation could
be that the dierent eects of men and women are driven by gender-specic
peculiarities, that is female managerial jobs may slightly dier from managerial
jobs taken by men.
Given these contrary eects of loosening hours restrictions in Germany, it is not
clear how the fraction of people meeting their desired working hours changes.
Therefore, I calculate the share of people who could reduce their gap between
actual and desired hours by switching to the "Dutch model".
In 1995, almost 75 percent of all male employees in our German sample could
improve their match. Among women, 57 percent would converge towards their
desired working hours. Three years later, the corresponding gures decrease to 50
percent for men and 53 percent for women. Thus, applying the hours exibility
of the Netherlands to the Germans improves the probability of fullling their
hours preferences. Note that for both, men and women, the average change in
the absolute deviation between actual and desired hours is higher for the winners
than for the losers (see Table 5).
Given the result that the gains from moving to the new situation is distributed
very unevenly, it is interesting to know how much we could over-weigh the losses
in such a way that society would just be indierent to the current situation and
the switch to the "Dutch model". Therefore I will impose the following loss
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Table 5: Changes in the mismatch of winners and losers
1995 1998
winners losers winners losers
% ; change
a
% ; change % ; change % ; change
Men 74.4  1:8 h 25.6 1.1 h 50.1  1:6 h 49.9 0.9 h
Women 56.9  4:4 h 43.1 3.8 h 53.2  2:6 h 46.8 2.6 h
Note:
a
average change in the absolute deviation between actual and desired working
hours.
Source: Own calculations based on the estimation results presented in Table 3.









where AD is the change in the absolute deviation between simulated and desired
hours. For  = 1; each individual's contribution to the loss function is equal to
his or her change in the absolute deviation between actual and desired working
hours. For  > 1; the increasing mismatch of the losers are over-weighted by the
factor . It is clear from table 5 that employees as a whole are better o if  = 1.
As a result, the  that would make society just indierent between switching
and not switching is above 1. The switching  for all male employees is 4.8 in
1995 and 1.8 in 1995. For women, the loss function is zero for  = 1:5 in 1995
and  = 1:1 in 1998. This illustrates that among women in 1998, the positive
welfare eects are almost completely set o by the losses of those women who
would be worse o in the simulated situation. For men however, the overall eect
is still clearly positive. These results back up the proposition of Kapteyn et al.
(2000) that allowing for the possibility of individual working hours reductions
may enhance welfare.
6.3 How about employment eects?
Given the overall drop in weekly working hours, it is tempting to calculate the
employment eects caused by the switch to a more exible labor market. This
estimation would be based on the simple notion that the amount of labor input
required to produce a xed volume of output can be shared between employed
and currently unemployed persons. But, the relation between working hours
and employment is very complex (see e.g Hamermesh, 1993). Working hours
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and workers are not perfect substitutes and rms do not necessarily replace the
individual reduction of weekly working hours by hiring new employees.
In consideration of the poor employer information available in the GSOEP, it is
hopeless to decide if and to which extent the reduced working hours could be
shifted to unemployed. The only thing I could do is to derive a rough guess of
the potential employment eects ignoring all niceties, such as adjustment costs,
overtime premiums, productivity and scale eects or shortage of workers. As-
suming that all employees can freely choose their working hours and that the
surplus hours can be transferred to unemployed, employment increased by 2.9
million people in 1995 and 1.5 million in 1998.
18
The corresponding gures using
the sample weights of the GSOEP are 3 million additional jobs in 1995 and 1.7
million in 1998. In contrast to these estimates (see also Schilling et al., 1996), I
could allow for hours restrictions inherent in certain occupations. In this setting,
estimated employment eects based on the Dutch labor market exibility turn
out to be substantially smaller. In 1995, 2.2 million (weighted: 2.0 million) ad-
ditional part-time and full-time employees could enter the labor market. Three
years later, the absorbency shrinks to 890 thousand employees (weighted: 870
thousand). Nevertheless, this guess is still not very convincing for the reasons
mentioned above. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper I will elaborate condi-
tions under which the employment eects out of increasing hours exibility could
be maximized.
 elasticity of product demand:
If the elasticity is high enough, the rm could enforces competitiveness if
it used the productivity growth due to the reduction in working hours for
lower prices. As a result, product demand would rise and increase labor
demand.
 compensation:
Compensation for reductions in weekly working hours diminish the potential
employment eects, because the gains from work-sharing are not shared
among people out of the labor market. Thus, eective work-sharing must
be cost-neutral.
 fixed costs:
The smaller the share of xed labor costs, the easier the substitution of
hours and workers. In general, xed employment costs, such as recruit-
ing and training costs are lower for low-skilled employees (see for example
18
In contrast to Schilling et al. (1996), I distribute the surplus hours among unemployed such
that the distribution of working hours within each occupational group remains the same.
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Hamermesh and Rees, 1988). Therefore, the substitution between hours
and workers is easier for low- and unskilled labor.
 lifetime working hours patterns:
The use of exible working hours arrangements enables a substitution of
even small reductions of working hours into employment. Employers can
schedule working hours depending on the volume of work and employees
could use additional hours for sabbatical or early retirement. More ex-
tensive reduction of individual working hours could implemented by job-
sharing among two or more employees. Presumably, the implementation of
exible working hours arrangements is easier in bigger rms.
 unions:
Union power may be detrimental to work-sharing. The consensual decision-
making between unions, employers and the government is seen as an impor-
tant condition for the exceptional employment growth in the Netherlands.
It is unlikely that the powerful unions in Germany would tolerate a strong
government strength in collective bargaining, such as in the Netherlands.
In addition, weak unions would rather take the opportunity to regulate and
control the new exible work arrangements in order to recruit new mem-
bers, like in the Netherlands (Schmid and Helmer, 1998), than block the
part-time trend, fearing that it could undermine the standards of traditional
jobs.
7 Conclusions and policy implications
The lack of working hours exibility is regarded as an important hindrance for
work-sharing in Germany. In this paper I simulate the eects of loosening hours
restrictions on Germans' labor supply in 1995 and 1998. A reduced-form labor
supply model with hours restrictions is used to describe how the working hours
preferences of the Dutch translate into their actual labor supply. Applying the
estimated coeÆcients of this "Dutch model" to the German data allows one to
calculate the hypothetical labor supply of Germans in the Dutch labor market.
The outcome represents the simulated working hours of Germans in a more exi-
ble world, namely the labor market in the Netherlands. Of course, the estimated
eects of loosening hours restrictions on the supply of labor strongly depend on
the extent of prevailing constraints in Germany. Thus, less hours restrictions, as
observed in 1998, would imply smaller eects.
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Three primary observations should be made about the results. Firstly, compar-
ing the mismatch between desired and actual weekly working hours of German
employees in 1995 and 1998 illustrate that hours exibility increased within this
period. However, the comparison with the Netherlands indicates that the Dutch
already had a higher probability to meet their working hours preferences in 1994.
Therefore, I conclude that the Dutch labor market is indeed more exible than
the German one.
Secondly, the overall match between desired and actual working hours of German
employees improves if they are faced with the Dutch working hours distribution.
But, the gains frommoving to the new situation are distributed very unevenly. On
the one hand, people wanting to work part-time have a much higher probability of
realizing their preferences. Especially jobs with 20 or fewer hours per week seem
to be much more feasible in the more exible labor market. This indicates that
the Dutch working hours exibility would permit more work-sharing in Germany.
On the other hand, German women who want to work full-time hours are more
likely to be "overemployed" if they had a Dutch labor market.
Thirdly, given the fall of weekly working hours, work could be shared among more
individuals. Compared to estimates ignoring the fact that certain working hours
preferences are hardly feasible, the potential employment eects based on my
approach are much smaller. Even if the derivation of expected employment eects
is very tempting, this venture is doomed to failure. Working hours and workers
are not perfect substitutes and rms do not necessarily replace the individual
reduction of weekly working hours by additional employees. Therefore, conditions
under which the employment eects out of increasing hours exibility could be
maximized are described.
Based on these reections, one can derive some policy implications for Germany.
It is argued that working hours set o by low-skilled workers are more likely to
be transformed to new jobs than hours set o by high skilled employees. Since
the willingness to cut hours is rather low among low-paid workers, government
could take up measures to foster voluntary reductions in individual working-time.
This objective may be achieved by subsidizing social security contributions of
low-income part-timers in order to remove cuts in social benets caused by part-
time employment. Another option is to pay incentives to the rm. In France,
for example, a scheme to reduce employers' social security contribution by 30
percent for jobs with a duration between 16 and 32 percent of normal hours
was introduced in 1992. The rate of take-up is pretty high and the proportion
of subsidized workers formerly unemployed or out of the labor force is around
half of the total. However, as with other employment subsidies, these programs
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are generally subject to substantial dead-weight and displacement eects and
therefore are questionable strategies (OECD, 1998b).
In my view, the detachment of social security from employment history seems
to be the most eÆcient measures to foster individual working hours reductions.
In Germany, employees have incentives to work full-time hours in order to get
higher benets, because all benets depend on the individual work history (Ginn
and Arber, 1998). Rische (1994) illustrates that the eect of part-time work
on pension benets depends furthermore upon the overall part-time share. The
benet cut due to part-time work is especially pronounced if only few people
decide to reduce their working hours. In this case, the average earnings level,
which is the reference point for the corresponding benet cut, would remain the
same. Thus, rst movers are particularly punished by individual working hours
reductions. In the Netherlands, the general old-age pension (AOW) and since
1995 the basic benets of the unemployment insurance provide benets that are
independent of the number of hours worked in the past and therefore involve few
disadvantages for part-time employees.
Another important condition for eective part-time initiatives is the consen-
sus among unions, government and employees on this matter, exemplary in the
Netherlands. Historically, German unions have mistrusted and disapproved part-
time work because it does not meet the requirements of the traditional breadwin-
ner model and undermines employment prospects of males (Hakim, 1997). As
part of the "Bundnis fur Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfahigheit" and the
discussion about the old-age part-time scheme, they seem to revise their think-
ing about part-time work, albeit that the unions' attitude towards non-standard
work arrangements is still reserved. In addition, the strong decline of membership
may give unions the push to represent women's interest by supporting exible
working time arrangements. In the Netherlands, for example, more than half of
the collective pay agreements include the right of employees to express individual
working hours preferences and the employer's obligation to comply with these
wishes, provided that no reasons to do with the state of the company are against
it (Fajertag, 1996).
Last but not least, rms should be encouraged to reorganize their working pro-
cess and introduce exible working-time arrangements. "Flextime" makes the
substitutions of hours and workers and easier and reduces the need for overtime
payments. Besides, rms using exible working hours report that productivity
and motivation of employees increase, absenteeism and uctuation are moderated
and that they have better perspectives to recruit scarce highly skilled employ-
ees. Despite this, human resource managers often have substantial reservations.
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Especially high-skilled employees and managers are in general excluded from the
option to reduce their working hours. Therefore, public programs to promote
exible working hours for skilled workers and managers, such as the subsidized
consulting program "MOBILZEIT", may be desirable because they may increase
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Table 6: Descriptive sample statistics for employees
Germany Netherlands
1995 1998
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
; jAH  DHj
a
11.3 13.2 10.8 12.9 7.4 10.0
; jAH  DHj for employees 6.8 8.9 5.7 7.2 5.1 5.8
; AH
b
38.5 10.7 37.3 9.9 35.9 10.9
; DH
c
34.7 10.9 34.9 9.4 33.6 9.4
schooling (in years) 11.9 2.5 11.9 2.3 12.7 3.3
experience (in years) 21.7 10.9 21.8 10.4 17.3 10.8
tenure (in months) 65.8 92.5 112.9 109.5 117.8 105.7
freq. % freq. % freq. %
female 2610 43.49 2562 44.81 947 37.88
married 4128 68.78 3741 65.42 1696 67.84
kids in hh 2658 44.29 2037 35.62 1021 40.84
civil servent 405 6.75 451 7.89 528 21.12
legislator/manager 393 6.55 283 4.95 240 9.60
professional 477 7.95 485 8.48 167 6.68
teacher/nurse 468 7.80 544 9.51 382 15.28
technician/associate prof. 707 11.78 843 14.74 337 13.48
clerks 1079 17.98 923 16.14 343 13.72
service/sales worker 971 16.18 969 16.95 461 18.44
production worker 1907 31.77 1671 29.22 570 22.80
# of observations 6002 5718 1553
Note:
a
: mean absolute deviation between actual and desired working hours;
b
: mean actual working hours of employees;
c
: mean desired working hours of
employees.
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18.5 2.8 43.5 35.2 6.3 15.0 h 58.0 18.7 17.9 5.5 25.7 11.1 h
EPT
d
4.5 12.9 58.9 23.8 5.9 10.5 h 11.9 41.1 39.2 7.9 24.5 6.8 h
FT
d
0.9 1.2 64.9 33.1 68.8 4.6 h 3.5 7.1 69.6 19.8 49.8 4.7 h
OT
d
0.8 0.5 34.9 63.9 19.0 6.5 h - - - - - -
P
2




25.9 5.2 51.1 17.8 4.3 21.8 h 68.0 16.0 13.4 2.7 21.8 8.0 h
EPT
d
2.5 12.1 68.6 16.7 7.5 9.6 h 11.8 40.0 42.4 5.8 27.9 6.8 h
FT
d
1.0 1.3 72.3 25.4 74.0 4.0 h 3.7 8.9 73.6 13.9 50.3 4.4 h
OT
d
0.9 0.7 43.9 54.5 14.3 7.0 h - - - - - -
P
2




41.7 10.4 33.3 14.6 3.1 11.6 h 78.6 16.8 3.1 1.4 36.9 3.6 h
EPT
d
0.7 22.1 47.8 29.4 17.7 8.1 h 8.3 56.2 22.6 12.9 36.7 5.2 h
FT
d
0.6 1.6 56.8 41.0 71.6 4.0 h 4.8 9.6 67.7 17.9 26.4 3.9 h
OT
d
0.9 0.9 24.6 73.7 7.6 6.0 h - - - - - -
P
2
1.9 5.5 52.1 40.6 100 5.1 h 33.3 29.3 27.3 10.0 100 4.2 h
Note: Subscripts d indicate categories of desired working hours (rows) and subscripts a
denote the corresponding category of actual working hours (columns);
1
distribution of
desired weekly working hours (in per cent);
2
distribution of actual weekly working hours;
3
mean absolute deviation between actual and desired working hours (in hours).
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1995 and 1998 for Germany and the
OSA-data for the Netherlands.
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